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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to an Order of transfer 
dated January 10, 1989 from the Utah Supreme Court under Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2-2(4) and Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. The Utah Supreme Court had Jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (j ). 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is an appeal from an Order based upon a Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed by Defendant-Appellee Hercules under which 
Plaintiff-Appellant's mechanic's lien cause of action was 
dismissed and an appeal from a final Judgement following trial 
under which Plaintiff-Appellant's cause of action for failure to 
obtain a payment bond was dismissed. The Order and final Judgment 
were both issued by the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented by this appeal are stated as follows: 
a. Whether the trial court committed an error of law when it 
ruled that the alienability of an interest in real property 
affects the validity or enforceability of a mechanic's lien filed 
against that interest pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-1 et 
seq. (1953 as amended); and 
b. Whether the trial court incorrectly ruled that modular 
office complexes of the configuration and magnitude of those which 
were constructed for Defendant Hercules do not require the project 
owner to obtain a payment bond in connection with the work 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended prior to 
1986). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are three statutes set forth in the Addendum hereto. 
First, is Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended in 
1985); Second, is Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as 
amended in 1987); and Third, is Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953 
as amended in 1985). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of the Plaintiff-Appellant supplying 
construction materials for the construction of approximately 
25,000 square feet of office space in two complexes for Defendant-
Appellee Hercules. Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Notice of Lien 
against the subject property with the Salt Lake County Recorder 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-1 et seq. (1953 as 
amended). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action for breach of 
a joint-check agreement against Defendant Modulaire, for failure 
to obtain a payment bond as required by Utah Code Annotated § 14-
2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended prior to 1986) against Defendant-
Appellee Hercules, and for foreclosure of the mechanic's lien. 
The parties submitted various motions for summary judgment 
and memorandums in support thereof. The court below ruled that 
there were material issues of fact preventing the granting of 
summary judgment on all motions for summary judgment except on 
Plaintiff-Appellantfs and Defendant-Appellee Hercules' motions 
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relating to Plaintiff-Appellantfs mechanic's lien foreclosure 
cause of action. 
Following hearings on the motions for summary judgment, the 
trial court dismissed Plaintiff-Appellantfs mechanic's lien cause 
of action. The trial court ruled that the interest of Defendant-
Appellee Hercules in the subject property was not alienable and, 
therefore, Plaintiff-Appellant's mechanic's lien could not attach 
thereto. 
Prior to trial, Plaintiff-Appellant and Defendant Modulaire 
entered into a settlement agreement resolving all causes of action 
between Plaintiff and Defendant Modulaire. Thus, the only cause 
of action remaining at trial was for failure to obtain a payment 
bond against Defendant-Appellee Hercules pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended prior to 1986). 
At the end of trial, the trial judge ruled from the bench and 
dismissed Plaintiff-Appellant's failure to obtain a payment bond 
cause of action based upon the court's legal conclusion that the 
office complexes were not affixed to the subject property. 
Defendant-Appellee Hercules prepared findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and a final judgment. Plaintiff-Appellee filed 
objections based, in part, upon the exclusion of undisputed facts 
which should have been and were in fact part of the factual 
analysis upon which the trial court based its legal conclusions. 
Despite these objections by Plaintiff-Appellant to the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and to the final judgment, the court 
signed and entered the findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
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the final judgment in substantially the same form as prepared by 
Defendant-Appellee Hercules. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This action arises out of the Plaintiff-Appellant 
supplying construction materials for the construction of 
approximately 25,000 square feet of office space in two complexes 
for Defendant-Appellee Hercules. Trial Transcript — R. at 640, 
pp. 50 & 51. 
2. The office space was constructed with 30 modular office 
units, 14 feet by 60 feet each. One complex contains 19 units, 
Annex 15, and the other complex contains 11 units, Annex 16. 
Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3 — R. at 217. 
3. The complexes were constructed on land situated in 
western Salt Lake County which is used by Defendant-Appellee 
Hercules under an agreement between Defendant-Appellee Hercules 
and the United States Navy. Trial Exhibit 68D. 
4. The subject property comprises part of Defendant-Appellee 
Hercules' Bacchus Works operation. Affidavit of Ryder Christian 
Waring, Exhibit 2 — R . at 247. 
5. Defendant-Appellee Hercules contracted with Defendant 
Modulaire for the construction and supply of the modular office 
units. R. at 217 and Trial Transcript at p. 7. 
6. Space Building Systems contracted with Defendant 
Modulaire to perform the interior finish and other work on the 
project. R. at 226 and Trial Transcript at p. 7. 
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7. Space Building Systems has since been granted protection 
under the Unites States Bankruptcy laws. 
8. Plaintiff-Appellant supplied drywall and other interior 
finish materials to the project pursuant to a contract between 
Plaintiff-Appellant and Space Building Systems. Trial Transcript 
at p. 7. 
9. Plaintiff-Appellant was not paid by Space Building 
Systems in full for the materials it furnished to the project. 
Trial Transcript at pp. 11-13. 
10. Plaintiff-Appellant made demand for payment from 
Defendants and upon refusal of the Defendants to make payment for 
the materials, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Lien against the 
subject property with the Salt Lake County Recorder pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). Notice of 
Lien Attached to Complaint — R. at 15. 
12. On or about June 7, 1985, Defendant-Appellee Hercules 
entered into a contract with Defendant Modulaire for the 
construction of certain office complexes on property located 
approximately at 4100 South 8400 West. Affidavit of Ryder 
Christian Waring, Exhibit 2 -- R. at 247. 
13. On or about July 3, 1985, Modulaire entered a 
subcontract with Space Building Systems wherein Space Building 
Systems was to provide labor and materials in the construction and 
improvement of the office complexes and more particularly to 
"complete interior rough & finish walls & ceiling complete." 
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Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, Cover Sheet and Article 1. 
1 — R. at 226. 
14. From July 8, 1985, through September 26, 1985, John 
Wagner Associates d/b/a Grabber Utah (hereinafter "Grabber Utah") 
sold certain supplies and materials to Space Building Systems, 
which were installed, integrated and incorporated into the office 
complexes. Trial Transcript, Testimony of Robert Spencer, Ben 
Gabladon and Larry Bills. 
15. On October 10, 1985, Space Building Systems filed for 
relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 
16. The amount owing Grabber Utah for supplies and materials 
sold to Space Building Systems and incorporated into the Offices 
is $14,300.03, together with interest, costs and attorney's fees, 
less application of an undetermined principal payment which was 
part of a settlement between Plaintiff/Appellant and Defendant 
Modulaire. Trial Transcript at p. 13. 
17. On December 5, 1985, Plaintiff recorded a Notice of Lien 
with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office as Entry No. 4172790, 
Book 5715, Page 1421. Notice of Lien Attached to Complaint, 
Exhibit B — R. at 15. 
18. The construction contract between Space Building and 
Modulaire is an Associated General Contractors of America Standard 
Subcontract Agreement for Building Construction (hereinafter 
"subcontract"), with Modulairefs name and logo attached to the 
title page, signed as subcontractor and contractor, respectively. 
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Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, Subcontract Cover Sheet and 
pp. 1, 7 — R. at 226. 
19. The subcontract encompassed complete "electrical rough & 
finish interior." Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, section 
1.1 — R. at 226. 
20. The subcontract entitled Modulaire to lien waivers from 
Space Building, allowed deduction of payments to Space Building 
from Modulaire due to any claim of lien, required Space Building 
to keep the building reasonably clean from debris, permitted 
Modulaire to require a performance bond and labor and material 
payment bond, and stated that any disputes arising from the 
subcontract shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the 
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association. Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, 
articles 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 3.6, 6 and 10.1 (Emphasis Supplied) -- R. 
at 226. 
21. The Purchase Order between Modulaire and Hercules for 
procurement of the office complexes refers to them as "complexes" 
and "office complexes." Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3, 
pp. 1, 4 — R. at 217. 
22. The Purchase Order states that Hercules is "responsible 
for site preparation, sewer, water and electrical service hook-
ups. " Id-- at 2. 
23. The Purchase Order states that Modulaire is responsible 
for any repair or maintenance in the "shell of the office 
complex." _Id. at 4. 
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24. The tenor of Specification No. 9106 is that of the 
construction of a building or structure rather than a mobile unit. 
Affidavit of Ryder Christian Waring, Exhibit 1 — R. at 240. 
25. Modulaire' s Manufacturer's Statement of Origin to a 
Motor Vehicle refers to the Offices as a building: "The 
Corporation certifies that this was the first transfer of such new 
Modular building. . . . " Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 1 
(Emphasis Supplied) -- R. at 172. 
26. The Purchase Order, which specifies the lease terms, 
contains a recapture provision wherein Hercules is allowed to buy 
the Office complex with 50% of previously made lease payments 
going toward the purchase price. Affidavit of Chilton Leach, 
Exhibit 3, pp. 3-4 — 217. 
27. The Purchase Order provides Hercules with an option to 
extend the leases beyond the initial two year period with the 
extended lease rate in no case to be higher than the present 
monthly rates. Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3, pp. 1, 3— 
R. at 217. 
28. The Purchase Order provides for a certain dismantling 
cost if and when necessary. Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 
3, p. 1 (Emphasis Supplied) -- R. at 217. 
29. Complete water, sewer, telephone and electrical lines 
have been constructed and affixed to the office complexes; the 
wheels and hitches are removed; concrete sidewalks and stairs with 
steel railings lead to the office complexes; grading was performed 
in preparation for the office complexes; significant amounts of 
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asphalt were placed to create extensive parking areas with the 
asphalt fitting snugly within the serrated skirting and extending 
halfway up the skirting in certain areas; several units are joined 
to form expansive office complexes; Annex 15 is "L" shaped, joined 
by an enclosed, suspended walkway; Annex 16 is terraced and joined 
by interior stairwells; rain gutters and air conditioning units 
are attached; the interior is completely finished with carpet and 
drywall overlapping the joints of the connected, prefabricated 
shells; the office complexes, costing nearly one half million 
dollars, rest on a permanent foundation of cinder block; and the 
proposal for expansion of the parking lot for Annex 16 refers to 
the annex as "Building." Affidavit of Kurt C. Faux; Exhibit "1"-
- R. at 405. 
30. The subcontract refers to Hercules as the Owner. 
Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 4, subcontract Cover Sheet— 
R. at 226. 
31. Hercules states that it manages the property pursuant to 
an agreement with the United States Navy. Affidavit of Ryder 
Christian Waring, para. 6 (Emphasis Supplied) — R. at 168. 
32. Hercules states that it uses the property pursuant to a 
contract with the Government of the United States. Hercules' 
Answer to Complaint, para. 7 -- R. at 23. 
33. The contract with the United States Government grants 
Hercules wide-ranging use and control of all the "facilities" (the 
term "facilities" under said contract means "all property provided 
under the contract"). The property is occupied with the 
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Government's permission, and Hercules' interest is subordinate to 
the Government's interest. Affidavit of Ryder Christian Waring, 
Exhibit 2, General Provisions For Facilities Use Contracts, Clause 
Numbers 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15 and 29 — R. at 247. 
34. Hercules initially spent approximately one half million 
dollars for the office complexes. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
With regard to the dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant's 
mechanic's lien cause of action on summary judgment, the trial 
court erred in two respects in ruling that Plaintiff-Appellant's 
mechanic's lien could not attach to the interest of Defendant-
Appellee Hercules in and to the subject property. First, there is 
nothing in the Facilities Use Agreement between Defendant-Appellee 
Hercules and the United States Government which is an absolute bar 
to the alienability of Hercules interest in the property. In 
fact, the Facilities Use Agreement contemplates the possibility of 
such liens. Second, there is nothing in the mechanic's lien 
statute which requires that an interest in real property must be 
alienable in order for a mechanic's lien to attach. 
With respect to the dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant's 
failure to obtain a payment bond cause of action, the trial court 
erred in ruling that the office complexes were personal property 
which were not affixed to the subject real property. Based upon 
the full facts and circumstance presented to the trial court, the 
correct legal conclusion is that the office complexes do 
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constitute "construction, addition to, alteration or repair of any 
building, structure or improvement." 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This argument addresses two primary issues. First, the 
alienability of Defendant-Appellee Hercules' interest in and to 
the subject property does not affect whether a mechanic's lien can 
attach to such interest. And second, the facts presented to the 
trial court do not support the legal conclusion that the office 
complexes are personal property which has not become affixed to 
the real property. In the alternative, such facts show that the 
traditional test of fixtures v. personal property cannot apply in 
the case at bar and still give effect to the clear legislative 
intent with regard to mechanic's lien and payment bond claims. 
Since the mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes are in 
para materia and since this appeal involves both mechanic's lien 
and payment bond matters, the issues will be discussed in terms of 
both statutes. Adjudications of payment bond statutes are helpful 
in determining mechanic's lien issues and adjudications of 
mechanic's lien statutes are helpful in determining payment bond 
issues liens. King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 440 P.2d 17, 
19, (Utah 1968). 
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1985) 
states, in pertinent part: 
The owner of any interest in land entering 
into a contract, involving $2,000 or more, for 
the construction, addition to, alteration, or 
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repair of any building, structure or 
improvement upon land shall, before any such 
work is commenced, , obtain from the 
contractor a bond in a sum equal to the 
contract price, with good and sufficient 
sureties, conditioned upon the faithful 
performance of the contract and prompt payment 
for material furnished, equipment and 
materials rented, and labor performed under 
the contract. 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953 as amended in 1981) 
states, in pertinent part: 
Contractors, Subcontractors and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing or 
renting any materials or equipment used in the 
construction, alteration, or improvement of 
any building, structure or improvement to any 
premises in any manner . . «, shall have a lien 
upon the property upon or concerning which the 
they have rendered service, performed labor or 
furnished or rented materials or equipment for 
the value of the service rendered, labor 
performed or material or equipment furnished 
or rented by each respectively . . . . Such 
liens shall attach to only such interest as 
the owner may have in the property. . . . 
II. THE ALIENABILITY OF AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY DOES NOT 
AFFECT THE ATTACHMENT OF A MECHANIC'S LIEN TO THAT INTEREST 
1. There is Nothing in the Utah Mechanic's Lien Statutes or in 
the Cases Interpreting such Statutes Which Require Alienabil-
ity of an Interest in Real Property as a Precondition to 
Attachment of a Mechanic's Lien. 
Since Plaintiff-Appellant's mechanic's lien cause of action 
was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment, the standard of 
review is that all facts and reasonable inferences of proof are to 
be decided in a light most favorable to Plaintiff-Appellant. Gadd 
v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984); King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry 
Kiln Company, 374 P.2d 254 (Utah 1962). 
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The court below ruled that Defendant-Appellee Hercules' 
interest in the property is not alienable and held that in such a 
situation, a mechanic's lien could not attach to that interest. 
The ruling that Defendant-Appellee Hercules interest is not 
alienable is not supported by the evidence presented to the trial 
court at the motion for summary judgment. For example, the 
agreement between Defendant-Appellee Hercules contains a promise 
by Hercules to keep the property free from all liens, thus, 
anticipating to possibility of encumbrances. See Affidavit of 
Ryder Christian Waring, Exhibit 2, General Provisions for 
Facilities Use Contract, Paragraph 8 -- R. at 275. Also as an 
example, Defendant-Appellee Hercules is not only allowed to use to 
subject property without payment therefor in the performance of 
government contracting work, it is also authorized to use the 
property for any other purpose and as long as Defendant-Appellee 
Hercules pays the appropriate monetary rental therefor. See 
Affidavit of Ryder Christian Waring, Exhibit 2, General Provisions 
for Facilities Use Contract, Paragraph 2 -- R. at 270. 
From a reading of the entire Facilities Use Agreement, it is 
clear that there is no absolute bar to alienability of Hercules' 
interest. Defendant-Appellee Hercules asserted, and apparently 
the trial court believed, that a transfer of the property would 
result in an automatic termination of the Facilities Use 
Agreement. However, it appears to be within the discretion of the 
United States Government whether to terminate the Agreement upon 
such an occurrence. 
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Furthermore, to allow the trial court's "alienability" ruling 
to stand would contravene the clear purpose of the mechanic's lien 
and payment bond statutes and encourage owners of property to 
structure their dealings in such a way as to avoid the applicabil-
ity of the mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes. 
The purpose of Utah mechanic's lien statute is to provide 
protection to those who enhance the value of property by supplying 
labor or materials. Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982). The statute is liberally and broadly 
construed to effect this desired objective. Id.; AAA Fencing Co. 
v. Raintree Development, 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986). 
In its memoranda and at the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment, Defendant-Appellee Hercules argued that it has no legal 
interest in the real property, although it did admit that a 
Facilities Use Agreement exists between Defendant-Appellee 
Hercules and the United States Navy. The trial court found that 
Hercules did have some interest in the property but ruled that 
such interest was not alienable. 
And, while Defendant-Appellee Hercules nor the trial court do 
not term Hercules interest in the subject land as a lease under 
the Facilities Use Agreement, the law clearly does. A valid lease 
exists when there is (1) a binding contract in compliance with the 
statute of frauds; (2) possession by the tenant; (3) legal title 
in the landlord; and (4) a leasehold that is capable of being 
granted. Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol. II at 565-66 
(1978). All of these elements for a lease are satisfied in the 
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present case. If Hercules interest is indeed a lease, a 
mechanic's lien can attach thereto. 
Utah law permits a mechanic's lien to attach to interests 
less than fee simple, such as an equitable interest, a leasehold 
estate, and a building separate from the soil upon which it was 
erected. King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 440 P.2d 17, 19 
(Utah 1968); Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382 
(Utah 1982); See also Basic Refactories, Inc. v. Bright, 298 P.2d 
810 (Nev. 1956) (mechanic's lien valid though United State became 
lessor upon completion of construction). Accordingly, Defendant-
Appellee Hercules enjoys sufficient leasehold, or other, interest 
in the property to permit attachment of a mechanic's lien. 
Furthermore, the alienability of such interest does not, as a 
matter of law, affect the attachment of Plaintiff-Appellant's 
mechanic's lien. The mechanic's lien statute simply states that 
"Such liens shall attach only to such interest as the owner may 
have in the property . . . ." There is no requirement that such 
interest be alienable. Therefore, the decision of the trial court 
with regard to dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant's mechanic's lien 
cause of action on the ground that Defendant-Appellee's interest 
in the property is not alienable should be reversed. 
2. Defendant-Appellee Hercules is an Owner of the Subject Prop-
erty for the Purposes of the Utah Payment Bond Statutes, Utah 
Code Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended in 1985). 
Although the court below held that the interest of Defendant-
Appellee Hercules is not alienable and therefore not attachable by 
a mechanic's lien, it also ruled that Defendant-Appellee Hercules' 
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interest in the subject property was sufficient to qualify it as 
an owner for the purposes of the payment bond statutes. Since the 
purpose of the mechanic's lien and payment bond statutes is the 
same, the ownership requirements should also be the same. 
Throughout the case, Defendant-Appellee Hercules has argued 
that it was not required to obtain a payment bond under Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1985) or 14-2-1 (1953 as 
amended in 1965). This contention has been based upon at least 
two theories. First, it was contended that Defendant-Appellee 
Hercules is not an owner for purposes of the payment bond statute. 
Second, it was contended that the material supplied by Plaintiff-
Appellant was not in connection with "the construction, addition 
to, alteration or repair of any building, structure or improve-
ment." The first contention is discussed immediately hereafter 
and the second is discussed in Section III. below. 
Case law does not support Defendant-Appellee Hercules' 
proposition that it is not an owner for purposes of the payment 
bond statute. The duty of obtaining a payment bond is upon 
ff
'[t]he owner of any interest in land' who enters into a contract 
to construct an improvement thereon." King Bros., Inc. v. Utah 
Dry Kiln Co., 440 P.2d 17, 19 (Utah 1968) (Emphasis in Original) 
(Ownership of building in which installation was made was 
sufficient for Utah's bond statute to apply). The word land is a 
generic term which includes not only the soil, but everything 
attached to it by the course of nature, or by the hand of man, 
such as buildings, fixtures, and fences. Id.. "This is 
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particularly true with respect to these lien [and bond] statutes 
which should be liberally construed to effect their purposes." Id. 
The defendant in King Bros., Id., claimed that the payment bond 
statute did not apply since it claimed an interest only in the 
building and not in the underlying land. The Utah Supreme Court 
disagreed however by stating: 
The difficulty with the Defendant's position 
seems to be in the misapprehension that in 
order for the statute to be applicable the 
owner-builder must have an interest in the 
freehold itself, that is the "soil" which 
underlies the building, as distinguished from 
the broader concept of the "realty" which is 
improved. This is not an indispensable 
requirement. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also allowed mechanic's liens to 
attach to interests less than fee simple, such as equitable 
interests, leasehold interests and a building separate from the 
soil upon which it was erected: 
[A] building placed [on realty] should proper-
ly be regarded as part of the realty, and it 
therefore follows that the defendant of 
necessity must own some 'interest in the 
land.' Id. 
See also Buehner Block Company v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 
517 (1957); Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382 
(Utah 1982); and Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 
395, 464 P.2d 386 (1970). 
Thus, any interest in the property subjects the person 
authorizing the work to the provisions of the Utah mechanic's lien 
and payment bond statutes. Because Hercules has an interest in 
the property pursuant to the Facilities Use Agreement between 
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itself and the United States Navy, Utah's payment bond and 
mechanic's lien statutes apply and, therefore, Defendant-Appellee 
Hercules should be held personally liable for the debt incurred 
for the materials supplied by Plaintiff-Appellant to the office 
complexes. 
Furthermore, Utah law does not permit suppliers to be bound 
to the terms of lease agreements which work to avoid the bonding 
statute and to which they were not parties and of whose contents 
they had no knowledge. Metals Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of 
Commerce, 395 P. 2d 914 (Utah 1964) (Leaseholder of building 
subject to Utah's bond statute). Thus, Plaintiff-Appellant should 
not be restricted in its remedies as a result of an agreement 
between Defendant-Appellee Hercules and the United States 
Government to which Plaintiff-Appellant was not a party nor of 
which it had any knowledge. Allowing otherwise could result in 
easy circumvention of the statutes whose purpose clearly is to 
protect suppliers. IdL at 915. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, as a supplier of materials and supplier 
to Space Building Systems, had no way of knowing the arrangements 
between Space Building Systems, Modulaire, Hercules and the United 
States Government. Furthermore, it does not depart from good 
sense to assume that one who is paying thousands of dollars, even 
hundreds of thousands, for improvements to property had some 
interest in the property upon which the structure was situated. 
King Bros., 440 P.2d at 18. 
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In recent years, it is even more apparent that the Utah 
legislature intends that the ownership requirement be read 
broadly. In 1987, the Utah legislature amended Utah Code 
Annotated § 14-2-1 to include the definition of an "owner." 
Subsection (l)(b) reads, "'Owner1 means any person contracting for 
construction, alteration, or repair of any building, structure or 
improvement upon land." 
Thus, the trial court's ruling that Defendant-Appellee 
Hercules is an owner for the purposes of the payment bond statute 
should be upheld and the mechanic's lien of Plaintiff-Appellant 
should be held to have attached to the interest of Hercules in and 
to the subject property. 
III. THE FACTS PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT DO NOT SUPPORT THE 
LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT THE OFFICE COMPLEXES ARE PERSONAL 
PROPERTY WHICH HAS NOT BECOME AFFIXED TO THE PROPERTY; THE 
OFFICE COMPLEXES CONSTRUCTED BY MODULAIRE FOR HERCULES ARE 
AFFIXED TO THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY DUE TO THE TYPE AND 
MAGNITUDE OF THE COMPLEXES 
The purpose of Utah mechanic's lien statute is to provide 
protection to those who enhance the value of property by supplying 
labor or materials. Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982). The statute is liberally and broadly 
construed to effect this desired objective. Id*' AAA Fencing Co. 
v. Raintree Development, 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant-Appellee Hercules' contentions and the trial court's 
rulings are not in harmony with this principle. 
The heart of Defendant-Appellee's argument, and the basis for 
the trial court's decision regarding whether the work on the 
office complexes is covered by the Utah payment bond statute, Utah 
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Code Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended in 1985), is that 
pursuant to Mueller v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1279 
(Utah 1982), the office complexes are not fixtures to real 
property and therefore not covered by the bonding statute. In 
Mueller, Cache Valley Dairy contracted with Maxum Corporation to 
install a whey drying system on Cache's premises. Maxum 
subcontracted with Mueller and Dahle to install portions of the 
system. Cache paid a separate contractor to erect a prefabricated 
metal building on Cache's premises to house the system. Maxum was 
paid in full by Cache for the system and declared bankruptcy 
leaving Mueller unpaid. Mueller filed a mechanic's lien and sued 
to foreclose. The Utah Supreme Court held against Mueller stating 
that the building was constructed to house the system much in the 
same way many buildings are constructed to house farm machinery; 
further, the machinery had nothing to do with servicing the 
building such as furnace and duct work. Id. at 1284. In reaching 
this decision, a tripartite test was applied to distinguish 
between real and personal property for mechanic's lien purposes: 
(1) the manner in which the item is attached or annexed to realty; 
(2) whether the item is adaptable to the particular use of the 
realty; and (3) the intention of the annexor to make the item a 
permanent part of the realty. 
Before discussing each element of the test, it must be noted 
that the Mueller case is distinguishable from the present case. 
Rather than equating the whey drying equipment to the office 
complexes, the more appropriate analogy is with the prefabricated 
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metal building assembled to house the equipment. The prefabricat-
ed metal structure was chosen by Cache specifically because of its 
"versatility." Mueller at 1284. "It's a construction which is 
bolted together, it's very easily unbolted, and it provides 
maximum flexibility . . . ." Id. at 1284-85. Such flexibility 
would also allow the prefabricated building to be transferred from 
property to property; yet, there was no mention that the 
prefabricated building was not lienable. However, even though the 
prefabricated building was easily removable, the Court found that 
the manlift and walkway attached to the building were fixtures, 
at 1283, 1285. Thus, the prefabricated building had to qualify as 
lienable work in order for the manlift and walkway to be lienable 
as fixtures attached to the prefabricated building. Plaintiff-
Appellant's supplies and materials are likewise incorporated into 
Defendant-Appellee Hercules' office complexes. 
Further, in the case at bar, the office complexes are 
attached to sewer, water, electrical and telephone lines; the 
wheels and hitches are removed; there is approximately 25,000 
square feet of office space in the complexes; the office 
complexes, costing nearly one half million dollars, are situated 
on the property supported by cinder blocks resting on concrete or 
wooden pads and have been so situated for nearly four years; site 
preparation such as grading and trenching was performed to 
accommodate the office complexes; large paved parking lots either 
adjoin and/or abut and conform to the office complexes' skirting 
as if molded to the skirting and extends halfway up the skirting 
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in certain areas; concrete sidewalks and stairways with steel 
railings are erected to service the office complexes; the office 
complexes are joined together by heavy metal, bolts, wiring, and 
finish work, forming lengthy corridors; an enclosed, suspended 
walkway was constructed promoting access to an otherwise separate 
office building, enlarging the already lengthy corridors; and 
interior stairwells promote access to terraced offices units. See 
Trial Exhibits 1 through 63 and 80 through 117. See also 
Affidavit of Kurt C. Faux and Exhibit 1 thereto — R . at 405. 
Pursuant to the purpose and broad interpretation of the 
mechanic's lien statue, the only legal conclusion one can properly 
draw is that these office complexes are fixtures for the purposes 
of the payment bohd and mechanic's lien statutes. Any other 
conclusion based upon these facts is in error. Thus, Plaintiff-
Appellant is entitled to judgment against Defendant-Appellee 
Hercules for failure to obtain a bond. 
It is ironic that under Defendant-Appellee Hercules' 
argument, and under the logic adopted by the trial court, those 
installing the underground utilities for the office complexes 
(i.e., sewer, water, power) and those installing the concrete 
walkways and asphalt parking surface would likely have failure to 
obtain a bond and mechanic's lien claims, but those who did the 
primary work, including Plaintiff-Appellant, upon which all the 
other work depended would have no such rights. See First of 
Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assoc, 600 P.2d 521 
(Utah 1979). 
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Defendant-Appellee should not be allowed to circumvent the 
clear purpose of the payment bond and mechanic's lien statutes, 
which purpose is to protect those who perform work and supply 
material, such as Plaintiff-Appellant, by arguing the possibility 
that the Offices will be removed or are taxed as personal 
property. Removability and taxability do not deter the 
effectiveness of a mechanic's lien. Sanford v. Kunkel, 85 P. 363 
(Utah 1906) (mechanic's lien effective though house moved from one 
lot to another); Thorp Finance Corp. v. F.M. Wright, 399 P.2d 206, 
207-08 (Utah 1965) (house trailer type structures not motor 
vehicles though taxed as such); In re Wiley, 120 Vt. 359, 140 A.2d 
11 (1958) (mobile home fixed to real property though taxed as 
personal property). With modern equipment and ingenuity even 
brick buildings are moveable. Heath v. Parker, 604 P.2d 818 (N.M. 
1980). "To stretch a dwelling, wheel-less and motorless into a 
'motor vehicle' would be akin to saying that moving a furnished 
four or five-room house over the roads of Utah would make it a 
'motor vehicle.'" Thorp Finance Corp. v. F.M. Wright, 399 P.2d 
206, 207-08 (Utah 1965). 
Case law and commentaries support Plaintiff-Appellant's 
position that the office complexes are covered by the payment bond 
statute and are subject to mechanic's liens. Concerning whether a 
mobile home is a building, the Court in Commonwealth v. DePriest, 
77 Montg. 11 (Pa. C.P. 1959) held that a mobile home 46 feet by 
eight feet with wheels removed, resting on cinder block piers, and 
connected to electric, water and telephone service lines was a 
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"building" and permitted its use as a single family detached 
dwelling. Because a building on land is generally considered to 
be part of the realty, the burden of proof is upon the party who 
claims that the building is personal property to show that it 
retains that character. 35 Am.Jur.2d, Fixtures, § 78 (1974). 
To be considered part of the realty, a building need not be 
physically anchored to the land. The force of gravity alone or 
skids suffice. Rinaldi v. Poller, 48 Cal. 2d 276, 309 P.2d 451 
(1957); 35 Am.Jur.2d, Fixtures § 78 (1974). Frame buildings 
resting on blocks or stones, or partly on the ground and partly on 
posts or blocks are fixtures. 35 Am. Jur.2d, Fixtures § 35 
(1974). In re Wiley, supra, held that a mobile home mounted on 
cinder blocks and two by four timbers, connected with the city 
sewer and water lines, and being used as and containing all the 
attributes of a dwelling was fixed to the real property. 
Determining that mobile homes are permanently attached to the 
land, the court in Coyle Assessment, 17 Pa. D&C 2d 149 (1958), 
upheld, for real property taxation purposes, an assessment against 
three mobile homes which had been jacked up, wheels removed, and 
set upon concrete blocks and pieces of timber. They each had 
water, sewage, and electrical connections and abutted upon 
concrete floors or patios. In distinguishing permanence from 
transitoriness, it is not necessary to identify it with 
perpetuality. Rinaldi v. Goller, 48 Cal. 2d 276, 309 P.2d 451, 
453-54 (1957). 
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To state that the office complexes are not affixed to the 
land is to fictionalize reality. The above facts and case law 
evidence that the office complexes were intended to be and are 
affixed to the realty. Because the office complexes are on cinder 
block columns resting on concrete or wooden pads does not alter 
their affixed nature; prior case law has made that decision. 
Surely the Defendants did not place office complexes costing 
nearly one half million dollars on such a foundation believing 
such to be insufficient. Indeed, the office complexes have been 
on such a foundation for nearly four years. These office 
complexes contain all the modern office conveniences such as 
electricity, sewer, telephone and water hook-ups; a large asphalt 
parking area; concrete sidewalks; interior stairways; and a lease 
permitting indefinite use, even purchase, should Defendant-
Appellant Hercules desire. The possibility that Hercules may 
choose to "un-affix" the office complexes at some point in the 
future is irrelevant in determining the current status of the 
office complexes. 
Construing the payment bond and mechanic's lien statutes 
liberally to protect suppliers as required by Utah law, the facts 
of this case require a legal conclusion that the office complexes 
are fixtures and are, therefore, covered by the payment bond and 
mechanic's lien statutes. 
While Plaintiff-Appellant does not believe that the 
tripartite test of Mueller should apply to large structures such 
as these office complexes, and urges the Court to so hold, the 
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Mueller test, discussed below, reinforces Plaintiff-AppellantTs 
position. The Mueller test involves 1) annexation, 2) adaptation, 
and 3) intention of permanency. 
1. Annexation. 
Defendants argue that because the office complexes are 
removable, they, like the equipment in Mueller, are not affixed to 
real property. Removing equipment from the prefabricated metal 
building in Mueller is much different than removing the 
prefabricated metal building from the real property. As mentioned 
previously, the prefabricated, versatile building is far more like 
the office complexes than the whey drying equipment. Where the 
issue is annexation of large buildings or structures, the 
tripartite Mueller test should not apply. Removability of such 
buildings or structures should not alter the validity of payment 
bond claims or mechanic's liens resulting from the improvement of 
the property by the erection of the building or structure. The 
materials and supplies incorporated by Defendants into the Offices 
are analogous to the manlift and walkways in Mueller which were 
considered fixtures and which gave rise to a mechanic' s lien in 
favor of those who supplied and installed them. 
The cost to dismantle and remove the offices complexes, if 
the Defendant-Appellee Hercules ever does this, is approximately 
$21,600. Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3, p. 2 — R. at 
218; Trial Exhibit 64, p. 2. Accordingly, the ease of 
removability seems highly exaggerated. The office complexes are 
hooked together, by bolts, metal beams, drywall, carpet, ceiling 
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tile and track, and, in some locations, interior partition walls. 
Exterior siding, interior stairways, a suspended walkway and 
finish work overlapping Office connections must be destroyed to 
allow removal. Electrical, sewer, telephone and other power lines 
extending from unit to unit or from complex to complex require 
removal and would be useless without the presence of the office 
complexes. 
In addition to the costs stated above, following possible 
removal, if any, the real property will be damaged in that actual 
underground utility improvements are on the land and connected to 
the office complexes, a massive asphalt parking lot with asphalt 
extending nearly halfway up the skirting in certain areas will be 
left behind, concrete sidewalks with steel railings will remain 
and the property will retain the grading improvements made 
specifically for the trailers. (Affidavit of Kurt C. Faux, 
Exhibit 1). All of these improvements will be left behind upon 
removal, if any, and will also require removal if the land is to 
be used other than for the office complexes. Furthermore, the 
absence of the office complexes will leave large unpaved holes in 
the asphalt of the parking lot and the utility stub-outs will 
remain. See photographs marked as Trial Exhibits showing effect 
of removal of another office complex, Annex 9. 
2. Adaptation. 
At the motions for summary judgment and at the trial of the 
case, Defendant-Appellee Hercules argued that there was no 
adaptation because the property was vacant and adaptable to 
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various uses. Apparently, Defendant-Appellee Hercules is 
referring to the property's status before the office complexes 
became affixed. "Adaption occurs when personal property is 
integrated into real property in furtherance of a specific purpose 
to which the real property has been devoted. . . ." Mueller, at 
1283-84. The specific purpose of the property in the instant case 
was and is to support Defendant-Appellee Hercules in the produc-
tion of certain goods for the United States Government, such as to 
accommodate the office complexes at issue herein. (Affidavit of 
Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3) See State Road Commission v. 
Pauanikolas, 427 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah 1967). The site was prepared 
specifically for the office complexes, grading and trenching were 
performed, concrete sidewalks and stairs with stee^ l railings were 
installed and the various utilities described above were prepared. 
(Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3, p. 4). Under Defendant-
Appellee Hercules' unrealistic argument, no office building would 
ever be adapted if constructed on a previously vacant lot. 
3. Intent. 
The intention of the real property owner is the most 
important factor of the tripartite test for traditional personal 
property. Mueller. at 1284. While the stated intent of 
Defendant-Appellee Hercules is that these were intended to be 
temporary, the facts belie that assertion. The office complexes 
were obtained for an initial period of two years. However, this 
had nothing to do with the expected duration of these office 
complexes, but was determined by an internal policy of Defendant-
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Appellee Hercules. Trial Transcript, pp. 58 & 59. The office 
complexes have been retained by Defendant-Appellee Hercules under 
the extension provisions of the purchase order through at least 
the time of briefing. 
The intent stated by Defendant-Appellee Hercules is not 
persuasive because the documentary evidence presented by 
Defendants is a far better indication of the parties' intent than 
the self-serving, after-the-fact statements made in the affidavits 
of Chilton Leach and Ryder Christian Waring and the testimony of 
Ryder Christian Waring at the trial. In the present case, the 
Purchase Order between Defendant-Appellee Hercules and Defendant 
Modulaire allows for purchase options and lease extension terms 
beyond the initial period. 
Furthermore, even if there is a finding that the parties to 
the purchase order did have some serious notion about the removal 
of the office complexes, that does not govern. The intent of the 
parties is only one factor in the analysis. Certainly, where 
there are office complexes of the size and magnitude involved in 
this case, the presumption should be toward a finding that the 
buildings or structures are affixed. This coupled with the 
previous analysis that the office complexes were annexed and 
adapted to the property weigh in favor of a finding that the 
office complexes are fixtures or improvements to the land. 
The office complexes have been on the land for nearly four 
years. The purchase order, which Defendant-Appellee Hercules 
contends evidences the intent to make the office complexes a non-
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permanent part of the real property, is entitled "Purchase Order," 
contains a "buy option," and provides an option for Hercules to 
extend the lease for, apparently, an indefinite period of time 
with rental payments not to exceed those originally in effect. 
Affidavit of Chilton Leach, Exhibit 3 — R. at 217. 
As a matter of policy, to place too much emphasis on the 
issue of intent for purposes of determining whether property 
becomes a fixture invites abuse and after-the-fact protectionism 
by owners declaring that the property was intended to be temporary 
from the outset. Under Defendant-Appellee's urged reading of the 
Mueller test, a person would be able to defeat the bond and lien 
rights of those working on traditional construction projects. All 
the owner would have to do is to declare that the building was 
intended to be temporary. 
Such a result would not be proper in that situation and it is 
not proper in the present case. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah's mechanic's lien and bond laws are liberally construed 
to protect those who provide labor, materials and equipment for 
projects such as the office complexes built for Defendant-Appellee 
Hercules. Defendant-Appellee Hercules holds and interest in and 
to the subject property which is sufficient for Plaintiff-
Appellant's mechanic's lien to attach. Thus, Plaintiff-Appellant 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the 
trial court at summary judgment by reinstating Plaintiff-
Appellant's mechanic's lien cause of action against the subject 
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property and remand for further proceedings in the foreclosure of 
that mechanic's lien. 
Further, based upon the policy underlying the mechanic's lien 
and payment bond statutes, and based upon the facts and 
circumstances presented at the motions for summary judgement and 
at the trial of the case, the office complexes became affixed to 
the subject real property. This is the only legal conclusion 
which can be properly drawn from the facts presented. Therefore, 
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the decision of the trial court following the trial of the case by 
reinstating Plaintiff-Appellant's failure to obtain a bond cause 
of action and remand the case for a determination as to the amount 
of the judgment. 
DATED this 17th day of April, 1989. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C. 
/ 
(/ / J I l ( -..rr 
By: V^^;^-^-;-—~r- L~^<^ -^^ 
Darrel J. Bostwick 
Attorneys-for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 et seq. (1953 as amended in 1985) 
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. 
The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, 
involving $2,000 or more, for the construction, addition to, 
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement 
upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain from 
the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract price, with 
good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful 
performance of the contract and prompt payment for material 
furnished, equipment and materials rented, and labor performed 
under the contract. This bond runs to the owner and to all other 
persons as their interest may appear. Any person who has 
furnished or rented any equipment or materials ,or performed labor 
for or upon any such building, structure, or improvement, for 
which payment has not been made, has a direct right of action 
against the sureties upon such bond for the reasonable value of 
the rented materials or equipment furnished, for the reasonable 
value of the materials furnished, or for labor performed, not 
exceeding the prices agreed upon. This right of action accrues 40 
days after the completion, abandonment, or default in the 
performance of the work provided for in the contract. 
This bond shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon 
request. 
14-2-2. Failure to require bond - Direct liability - Limitation 
of actions. 
Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who 
shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit 
the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable to all 
persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the 
contract for the reasonable value of such materials furnished or 
labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices 
agreed upon. Actions to recover on such liability shall be 
commenced within one year from the last date the last materials 
were furnished or the labor performed. 
14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics and materialmen -
Attorneyf s fee. 
In any action brought upon the bond provided for under this 
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court, which shall be 
taxed as costs in the action. 
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14-2-4. Exceptions - Mortgagees, beneficiaries, trustees. 
Nothing in this chapter requires a mortgagee under a mortgage 
or a beneficiary or trustee under a deed of trust to obtain the 
bond described in § 41-2-1, or imposes any liability upon a 
mortgagee, beneficiary, or trustee who has not obtained such a 
bond. 
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 (1953 as amended in 1987) 
14-2-1. Definitions - Payment bond required - Right of Action-
Notice. 
(1) For purposes of this chapter: 
(a) "Contractor" means any person who is or may be awarded a 
contract for the construction, alteration, or repair of any 
building, structure, or improvement upon land. 
(b) "Owner" means any person contracting for construction, 
alteration or repair of any building, structure, or improvement 
upon land. 
(2) Before any contract, exceeding $2,000 in amount, for the 
construction, alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or 
improvement upon land is awarded to any contractor, the owner 
shall obtain from the contractor a payment bond complying with 
Subsection (3), which shall become binding upon the award of the 
contract to the contractor. 
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or sureties 
satisfactory to the owner for the protection of all persons 
supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the work 
provided for in the contract in a sum equal to the contract price. 
(4) (a) Any person who has furnished labor of material in 
the prosecution of the work provided for in such contract, in 
respect of which a payment bond is furnished under this chapter, 
and who has not been paid in full therefor within 90 days after 
the day on which the last of the labor was performed by him or 
material was supplied by him for which the claim is made, may sue 
on the payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time the suit is 
filed and may prosecute the action for the amount due him. Any 
person having a contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, 
but no express or implied contract with the contractor furnishing 
the payment bond, has a right of action upon the payment bond upon 
giving written notice to the contractor within 90 days from the 
date on which such person performed the last of the labor or 
supplied the last of the material for which the claim is made. 
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The person shall state in the notice the amount claimed and the 
name of the party for whom the labor was performed or to whom the 
material was supplied. The notice shall be served by registered 
or certified mail, postage prepaid, on the contractor at any place 
the contractor maintains an office of conducts business. 
(b) Any suit instituted under this section shall be brought in 
the district court of any county in which the contract was to be 
performed, and not elsewhere. No such suit may be commenced after 
the expiration of one year after the day on which the last of the 
labor was performed or material was supplied by the person. The 
obligee named in the bond need not be joined as a party in the 
suit. 
(5) The payment bond shall be exhibited to any interested 
person upon request. 
14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment bond - Liability. 
Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond is liable to all 
persons who have performed labor or have supplied materials under 
the contract for the reasonable value of the labor performed or 
materials furnished. No action to recover on such liability may 
be commenced after the expiration of one year after the day on 
which the last of the labor was performed or the material was 
supplied by such person. 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-3 (1953 as amended in 1981) 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien - What may be attached - Lien on 
ores mined. 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing 
any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment 
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials for the 
prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, 
plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, 
surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like 
professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon 
the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service, 
performed labor or furnished or rented materials or equipment for 
the value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the 
instance of the owner or of any other person acting by his 
authority as an agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall 
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attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the 
property, but the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or 
deposit, whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the 
purposes of this chapter include products mined and excavated 
while the same remain upon the premises included within the lease. 
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